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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
AT COVINGTON 
 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-219-WOB 
 
SARAH JONES        PLAINTIFF 
 
VS.     MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
DIRTY WORLD  
ENTERTAINMENT 
RECORDINGS, LLC, ET AL.    DEFENDANTS 
  
 
Background 
 
 At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence in 
the second trial of this case, the defendants made a timely 
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 50.    
 The motion was primarily based on the argument that 
the defendants were immune under the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.  The Court denied the motion 
for the same reasons expressed in its earlier opinion 
addressing this issue.  See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t 
Recordings, LLC, 840 F.Supp.2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012).    
 The jury hung in the first trial of this case, which 
necessitated a second trial.  The evidence in both trials 
regarding the claimed immunity was essentially the same as 
that described in the Court’s earlier opinion.  The case 
was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the 
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plaintiff for $38,000.00 compensatory damages and 
$300,000.00 punitive damages.1  (Doc. 207). 
 The Court now files this supplemental Memorandum 
Opinion to explain further its reasons for denying 
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
Analysis 
A. The precedents support the proposition that the CDA 
provides only a sort of qualified immunity that can be 
lost by the site’s intentionally developing and/or 
materially contributing to the illegal or 
objectionable material.  
 
 Throughout these proceedings, counsel for defendants 
has argued that no rational court could deny CDA immunity 
in this case, and that defendants’ claim for immunity was 
required by all existing precedents. 
                                                          
1 Defendants, apparently relying solely on their immunity 
defense, concede the propriety of these amounts since they 
chose not to file a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59(a).  See Young v. Langley, 793 F.2d 792, 794 
(6th Cir. 1986) (“This court may not review the alleged 
excessiveness of verdicts absent a timely motion for new 
trial and the trial court’s ruling thereon.”).  Failure to 
file such a motion also precludes appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  See Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. 
Co., 510 F.3d 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2008); Pennington v. 
Western Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Young, 793 F.2d at 794.  See generally 12 Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 59.55 (3d ed. 2013) (“Grounds for new trial that 
arise solely in the context of post trial proceedings must 
be presented to the trial court for consideration by a 
motion for new trial, and the failure to do so deprives the 
appellate court from any record that is reviewable for 
error.”). 
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  This contention misrepresents the law, however.  This 
Court’s ruling on the immunity issue is supported by the 
decisions of several United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and district court cases and, in fact, represents 
the weight of authority.  
 The principal precedent is the en banc decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc).  See Jones, 840 F. Supp.2d at 1000-11.  There, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a website did not enjoy CDA 
immunity for posting a questionnaire and requiring answers 
to it which were alleged to violate federal and state 
housing discrimination laws, because such acts constituted 
the “creation or development of information” and thus made 
the site an “information content provider” within the scope 
of 47 U.S.C. § 2309(c) and (f)(3).  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 
1164-69. 
Following remand and a decision on the merits of the 
underlying statutory housing claims, another appeal was 
taken.  In the resulting opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged and left undisturbed its prior CDA ruling, 
although it held that the website had not violated the 
housing statutes in question.  See Fair Housing Council of 
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San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 
(9th Cir. 2012).2 
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, 
speaking for a panel of that court, emphasized that the CDA 
does not provide “a grant of comprehensive immunity from 
civil liability for content provided by a third party.”  
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).  While 
finding the website “craigslist” to be entitled to CDA 
immunity in that case, the Court noted that “[n]othing in 
the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any 
particular listing or express a preference for 
discrimination.”  Id. at 671-72.  Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) 
(holding that distributors of software that enables file 
sharing through peer-to-peer networks can be liable for 
contributory copyright infringement if system is designed 
to enable and encourage stealing of music).  
                                                          
2 Defendants’ characterization of the Ninth’s Circuit 2012 
opinion in Roommates is thus seriously misleading.  See 
Doc. 177 at 2 n. 1 (stating that because the second 
Roommates appeal was terminated in the website’s favor, it 
“demonstrate[es] that the prior ruling denying CDA immunity 
to the website owner in that case was incorrect.”).  As 
noted, the Court held in defendants’ favor on grounds 
wholly unrelated to CDA immunity and implicitly re-affirmed 
its prior opinion. 
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has upheld application 
of CDA immunity but, in doing so, observed that its ruling 
was based on the fact that “the record contains no evidence 
that [the internet service provider] designed its website 
to be a portal for defamatory material or [did] anything to 
induce defamatory postings.”  Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 
785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010).     
 The Tenth Circuit also has held that a website could 
not claim immunity under the CDA if it was “responsible for 
the development of the specific content that was the source 
of the alleged liability.”  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).  Moreover, that 
Court held that one is not “responsible” for “developing” 
allegedly actionable information only “if one’s conduct was 
neutral with respect to the offensiveness of the content.”  
Id. at 1199. 
Thus, although Courts have stated generally that CDA 
immunity is broad, the weight of the authority teaches that 
such immunity may be lost.  That is, a website owner who 
intentionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party 
postings to which he adds his own comments ratifying or 
adopting the posts becomes a “creator” or “developer” of 
that content and is not entitled to immunity.  See, e.g., 
Hare v. Richie, Civil Action No. ELH-11-3488, 2012 WL 
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3773116, at *19 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2012) (noting that “the 
appellate case law regarding § 230(c)(1) contemplates that 
a website operator may be deprived of immunity if it 
‘designed its website to be a portal for defamatory 
material.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 
(8th Cir. 2010)).3   
                                                          
3 See also Hare, 1012 WL 3773116, at *17 (noting that 
“Dirty World’s involvement goes beyond mere editorial 
functions and extends to the creation of its own content – 
specifically, Mr. Richie’s comments at the end of each 
post”); S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392, 2012 WL 
3335284, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (distinguishing 
facts of case from this matter because there “[d]efendants 
neither adopted or encouraged further development of the 
post”); Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, Civil 
Action No. 3:06-cv-1710 (VLB), 2010 WL 669870, at *24 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 19, 2010) (denying motion for summary judgment 
because defendants may “have gone further and actively 
participated in creating or developing the third-party 
content submitted to the [defendants’] website”); Certain 
Approval Programs, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures L.L.C., No. 
CV08-1608-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 596582, at *1-3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 
9, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss because plaintiffs’ 
allegations that defendants “actively solicit defamatory 
content from third parties and directly encourage the use 
of hyperbole and exaggeration” to maximize marketability of 
false reports make it plausible that defendants are 
“information content provider” under the CDA)3; MCW, Inc. v. 
Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ. A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 
2004 WL 833595, at *8 (N.D. Tex. April 19, 2004) (“Section 
230(c) immunity is not so broad as to extend to an 
interactive computer service that goes beyond the 
traditional publisher’s role and takes an active role in 
creating or developing the content at issue.”); Hill v. 
Stubhub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) 
(noting that CDA analysis by this Court in this matter is 
“similar to that deemed appropriate in Accusearch and 
Roommates.”); Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126, 133-34 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing grant of summary judgment 
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The cases cited by defendants are entirely 
distinguishable because none involve facts where a website 
contributed to the development of actionable content by 
adding its own comments implicitly adopting an offensive 
posting and encouraging similar posts.  As noted above, 
Courts faced with such factual allegations have denied 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment based on CDA 
immunity.4 
B. The Text and Purpose of the CDA are Contrary to 
Defendants’ Interpretation.  
 
Even a cursory reading of the CDA reveals that 
affording immunity on the facts of this case would be 
inconsistent with the Act’s purpose.  
 The Act’s subtitle is “Protection for blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”  47 U.S.C. § 230.  Among 
the stated purposes of the statute are:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
because defendant requested potentially defamatory material 
and contributed her own thoughts to the overall post). 
 
4 Thus, defendants’ statement in their brief that CDA cases 
other than the one at bar “were all resolved by dispositive 
motion, approximately 99% in favor of the defendant” is 
misleading.  For example, the docket in Certain Approval 
Programs, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures L.L.C., No. CV08-
1608-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 596582 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 2009), 
reflects that the case was not resolved on dispositive 
motions.  Rather, after the Court denied the Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, the non-defaulting defendants settled.  
(Doc. 73).  The docket also reflects that defendants’ 
counsel was defense counsel in that case and would be aware 
of this fact. 
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(4)  to remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies 
that empower parents to restrict their children’s 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material;  and  
 
(5)  to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking and harassment by means of 
computer.   
 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4), (5).  See Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Another important 
purpose of § 230 was to encourage service providers to 
self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over 
their services.”). 
The title of the subsection where the immunity 
language appears is “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material.”  47 U.S.C. § 
230(c).  A subsequent subsection requires a website to 
notify customers of available filtering devices “that may 
assist the customer in limiting access to material that is 
harmful to minors.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(d).  Further, 
subsection (e)(3) provides:  “Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State 
law that is consistent with this section.” 
Thus, defendants’ proffered interpretation of CDA 
immunity would distort the intent of Congress in passing 
this Act and allow it to be used to subvert the law of 
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defamation which has existed at common law for centuries, 
as well as the laws protecting the right of privacy which 
were evolved by the courts in the last century.  See 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164 (“The Communications Decency 
Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the 
Internet.”).5 
 In the view of this Court, the Act’s text indicates 
that it was intended only to provide protection for site 
owners who allow postings by third parties without 
screening them and those who remove offensive content.  If, 
however, the owners, as in the instant case, invite 
invidious postings, elaborate on them with comments of 
their own, and call upon others to respond in kind, the 
immunity does not apply. 
C. The Evidence in this Case Demonstrates That Richie 
Played a Significant Role in Adopting and Developing 
Actionable Content. 
 
The evidence elicited on discovery and in both trials 
showed, as the jury found by clear and convincing evidence6, 
that defendants here received postings on their website 
                                                          
5 See Jeffrey Blevins, Court Decision Cautions Us to Care 
for the Truth, The Enquirer, Aug. 4, 2013, at F6 
(“[C]oncerns remain about commercial online services that 
put all of the responsibility for ethical conduct on their 
users, while accepting none of the blame themselves.”). 
 
6 Although the Court held that plaintiff was not a “public 
figure,” it instructed the jury to use the “public figure” 
test in an excess of caution.  
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which would be actionable even by a public figure, i.e., 
that they were knowingly false or in reckless disregard for 
the truth.  
 Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that 
these postings and others like them were invited and 
encouraged by the defendants by using the name “Dirty.com” 
for the website and inciting the viewers of the site to 
form a loose organization dubbed “the Dirty Army,” which 
was urged to have “a war mentality” against anyone who 
dared to object to having their character assassinated.  
 Specifically, defendant Richie added his own comments 
to the defamatory posts concerning plaintiff.  For example, 
on December 7, 2009, a third-party posted, under a large 
photo of plaintiff: 
Nik, here we have Sarah J, captain cheerleader of the 
playoff bound cinci bengals . . Most ppl see Sarah as 
a gorgeous cheerleader AND highschool teacher . . yes 
she’s also a teacher . . but what most of you don’t 
know is . . Her ex Nate . . cheated on her with over 
50 girls in 4 yrs . . in that time he tested positive 
for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea . . so im sure 
Sarah also has both . . whats worse is he brags about 
doing sarah in the gym . . football field . . her 
class room at the school she teaches at DIXIE Heights. 
 
(Doc. 64-2 at 32).  To this, Richie added his own tagline, 
in bold: “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the 
sack? – nik.”  (Id.).  The tagline and original message 
appear on one page as a single story. 
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 Thus, Richie’s conduct cannot be said to have been 
“neutral with respect to the offensiveness of the content,” 
such that he is not “responsible” for it within the meaning 
of § 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.  
 Defendants also argue that the fact that plaintiff 
ultimately declined to pursue this tagline as an 
independently-actionable statement alters this analysis and 
makes these facts “identical” to those in S.C. v. Dirty 
World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392, 2012 WL 3335284, at *5 (W.D. 
Mo. Mar. 12, 2012).  (Doc. 177 at 16-17).   
Defendants are mistaken, for the salient point about 
Richie’s tagline is not that it was defamatory itself and 
thus outside CDA immunity, but rather that it effectively 
ratified and adopted the defamatory third-party post.  The 
Court in S.C. recognized exactly this point.  Id. at *5. 
As the S.C. Court further noted, Richie made other 
comments which encouraged further defamatory posts 
concerning plaintiff, such as: “I love how the DIRTY ARMY 
has war mentality;” “Never try to battle the DIRTY ARMY;” 
and “You dug your own grave here Sarah.”  Following these 
comments, an additional defamatory post was made on the 
site on January 9, 2010, accusing plaintiff of “sle[eping] 
with every other Bengals Football player.”  (Doc. 64-2 at 
30).  
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 It is clear, therefore, that Richie did far more than 
just allow postings by others or engage in editorial or 
self-regulatory functions.  Rather, he played a significant 
role in “developing” the offensive content such that he has 
no immunity under the CDA, per the precedents discussed 
above. 
 The jury properly found that this conduct justified an 
award of punitive damages under the stringent requirements 
of KRS 411.184, which requires a showing of “oppression, 
fraud or malice” for all punitive damage awards.  
 
 This 12th day of August, 2013. 
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